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I. INTRODUCTION
How [does] rehabilitation proceed? One place to start a consideration
of this question is with the initial scream welling out of the torture
* J.D., LL.M., J.S.D. candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, Center for
Civil and Human Rights. I am very grateful to the Asia Foundation for providing the
funding necessary to complete this project, to the University of Notre Dame Law
Library Staff for their patient assistance in helping to locate many of these sources
and their constant (though subtle) reminders that eventually I needed to return the
same, and to Kelly Askin for her tireless, dedicated and unwavering commitment to
making me a better scholar.
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chamber. An old man, a teenage boy, a young woman five months
pregnant, is screaming in agony. And what is the torturer saying?
[H]e is saying, "Go ahead, scream, scream all you like, scream your
lungs out - nobody can hear you, nobody would dare to hear you,
nobody cares about you, no one will ever know.
It is essential to the structure of torture that it take place in secret, in
the dark, beyond considerations of shame and account. When the tor-
turer assures his victim that "No one will ever know," he is at once
trying to break the victim's spirits and to bolster his own. He needs to
be certain that no one will ever know; otherwise the entire premise of
his own participation in the perverse encounter would quickly come
into question.
That is the primordial moment which has desperately to be
addressed - and as desperately by the torture-society as by the torture
victim: Who was there? Who was screaming? Who were those people
standing by the screamer's side, and what were they doing? Who, even
now, will dare to hear? Who will care to know? Who will be held
accountable? And, who will hold them to account?'
Impunity is the torturer's most relished tool. It is the dictator's greatest
and most potent weapon. It is the victim's ultimate injury. And, it is the
international community's most conspicuous failure. Impunity continues
to be one of the most prevalent causes of human rights violations in the
world. As we near the new millennium, we must find effective ways to
combat this vexing predicament.
Impunity knows no territorial bounds and speaks no specific language.
It is not unique to any religion or race, and is not limited to any particular
geographical region. Impunity remains a world wide problem. The end
of the Cold War and the rise of nascent democracies throughout Latin
America and Eastern Europe have brought much needed attention to
this pervasive problem. Accordingly, the amount of literature and schol-
arly attention devoted to impunity continues to grow. This paper
attempts to familiarize the reader with a broad range of information
relating to impunity. The approach taken is mainly international,
2
although one section will be devoted solely to the history of impunity in
the Asian-Pacific region. Further, due to the limited scope of this review,
1 Lawrence Weschler, Afterword, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON
91-92 (The Aspen Institute ed., 1989) [hereinafter STATE CRIMES] (emphasis added).
2 This literature review analyzes international treaties, United Nations
Resolutions, books and scholarly articles in an effort to provide a practical, yet global,
approach to the subject of impunity. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see
generally infra notes 3-260 and accompanying text (providing citations, review and
analysis of various international sources covering impunity and impunity-related
topics).
IMPUNITY
only impunity relating to gross violations of human rights' will be
considered.
The first section of this paper reflects upon the definitions utilized in
the impunity vernacular. Impunity itself does not appear to be a con-
tested matter, yet no single definition encompasses the term and its many
variations. Examples of impunity are much easier to uncover than pre-
cise definitions of what the term "impunity" truly means. Nonetheless,
several definitions have been proffered and provide a solid foundation on
which to build.
The second portion of this paper focuses on the history of impunity
dating back to World War I. This paper references several international
treaties and presents a discussion regarding the Inter-American regional
system to provide the reader with sufficient background materials to rec-
ognize impunity. While impunity as a political tool and legal concept cer-
I See Human Rights Watch, Policy Statement on Accountability for Past Abuses, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMocRAcIEs RECKON WrmI FORMER
REGIMES VOL. I 217 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE]
(providing one of the most complete surveys regarding impunity and transitional
justice, and containing an array of documents and articles relating to transitional
justice for reference as a research starting place and as a source of substantive
information). According to the December 1989 Policy Statement on Accountability
for Past Abuses, Human Rights Watch considers the following acts or events as
constituting gross violations of human rights:
1) genocide;
2) arbitrary, summary or extrajudicial executions;
3) forced or involuntary disappearances;
4) torture or other gross physical abuses and violations of personal liberty;
5) prolonged arbitrary deprivations of liberty.
Id.
In addition to the delineation provided by Human Rights Watch, the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States is a credible source for
further review of those rights that are considered fundamental under customary inter-
national law, and provides that:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones:
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals;
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent patter of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.
RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF TH UNITED STATES § 702
(1987).
1999]
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tainly precedes World War I, many scholars delineate the omissions at
Leipzig as the starting place of modem impunity.'
The third section considers specific cases of impunity in the Asian-
Pacific region. Due to the limited scope of this paper, only the cases of
Cambodia, the Philippines and the Japanese treatment of "Comfort
Women" have been examined. These three examples are frequently cited
in scholarly literature and are generally illustrative of the Asian impunity
dilemma.
Although the focus of this review is impunity, another term will be uti-
lized throughout this survey, and it is important to present this term in
the introduction. The term is "accountability." Accountability, it has
been suggested, "is the antithesis of impunity."5 While impunity remains
a focus of debate and international efforts, the human rights community
is moving toward a culture of accountability. Essentially, accountability
is the effort aimed at curtailing impunity. Readers in this field will
undoubtedly come across the term accountability as it permeates modern
writing and as human rights scholars and activists use it more frequently.
This survey and the case studies presented herein focuses on three
main types of legal accountability:
(1) the use of prosecutions, both national and international, in an
effort to combat impunity;
(2) the resort to non-criminal sanctions, such as lustration laws and
political purgings that aim to remove human rights violators
from positions of power and influence; and,
4 See ARIEH J. KoCHAVI, PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG: ALLIED WAR CRIMES
POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT at 1-2 (1998).
5 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for
Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 9, 18 (representing one of
several articles included in one of the more thorough and significant impunity-related
publications to date that includes articles by many of the most prominent scholars in
this subject area such as: Madeline H. Morris, Michael Scharf, W. Michael Reisman,
Stephen Landsman, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Jennifer L. Balint, Neil J. Kritz,
Christopher C. Joyner, Priscilla B. Hayner, Mark S. Ellis and Douglass Cassel, and
that also includes separate reports of two United Nations Special Rappourteurs
(Louis Joinet and Theo van Boven) on the issue of impunity); see also Yael Danieli,
Justice and Reparation: Steps in the Process of Healing, in REIGNING IN IMPUNITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIRACUSA CONFERENCE 17-21 SEPTEMBER 1998 305
(Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1998) [hereinafter REIGNING IN IMPUNITY] (representing
one of the articles included in one of the more thorough and significant impunity
publications to date, that includes writings by numerous participants in the 1998
Siracusa Conference on Impunity, which took place in Siracusa, Italy in September
1998, including noteworthy articles prepared by M. Cherif Bassiouni, Priscilla Hayner,
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Luc Huyse, Diane F. Orentlicher, Juan E. Mdndez, Jason
Abrams, Madeline Morris, and Theo van Boven).
IMPUNITY
(3) the use of truth commissions as a substitute for, or in addition to,
other accountability mechanisms.
In describing each of these mechanisms, the common thread is a deter-
mination to combat impunity. While there is no "one-size-fits-all"
approach to impunity or accountability, it is hoped that this literature
review will provide pertinent information on the options available when
governments are confronted with gross violations of human rights.
II. DEmwrrioNs
Accountability means recognizing the moral responsibilities that
arise from the past, even if little can be done at a given moment to
enforce those responsibilities.6
Impunity, much like accountability, is a term with a distinct legal mean-
ing. Yet it is rare to find either phrase adequately defined in a particular
work. Rather, these terms have become so ubiquitous that their respec-
tive meanings are deemed obvious.
However, it is important for any study on impunity to provide a clear
description of what this phrase implies. Black's Law Dictionary defines
impunity as simply the "[e]xemption or protection from penalty or pun-
ishment."7 This characterization coincides with the meaning ascribed by
Amnesty International, an international non-governmental organization
("NGO") based in London, England.
Amnesty International explains that "[l]iterally, impunity means
exemption from punishment."' Amnesty International further expounds
upon this definition:
More broadly, the term [impunity] conveys a sense of wrongdoers
escaping justice or any serious form of accountability for their deeds.
Impunity can arise at any stage before, during or after the judicial
process: in not investigating the crimes; in not bringing the suspected
culprits to trial; in not reaching a verdict or convicting them, despite
the existence of convincing evidence which would establish their
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; in not sentencing those convicted,
or sentencing them to derisory punishments out of all proportion to
the gravity of their crimes; [and,] in not enforcing their sentences. 9
Amnesty International's approach seemingly fleshes out the mundane
definition provided by Black's Law Dictionary and indicates a certain
awareness of the factual parameters of impunity.
6 Aryeh Neier, What Should Be Done About the Guilty?, N.Y. Rlv. BooKs, Feb. 1,
1990, at 32 (emphasis added).
7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 758 (6th ed. 1990).
8 AmNs y INTERNATIONAL, "DISAPPEARANCEs" AND POLITICAL KILLINGS:
HumAN RIGHTS CmsIS OF THE 1990's 158 (1994) [hereinafter DisAPPEARANCES].
9 Id.
1999]
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In a similar vein, Professor Christopher C. Joyner writes that
"[i]mpunity ... means exemption or freedom from punishment and con-
notes the lack of effective remedies for victims of crimes. Within the con-
text of human rights law, impunity implies the lack or failure to apply
remedies for victims of human rights violations."'"
Certain scholars have attempted to further develop the term to encom-
pass its modem implications. Professor Cherif Bassiouni posits that
"[w]hile amnesty is a deliberate positive action (the act of amnesty),
impunity is an act of exemption, an exemption from punishment, or from
injury or loss."" Others have merely observed that impunity is a "de
facto situation of no punishment" that may result from amnesties or par-
don.' In an anthology entitled, IMPUNITY: AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE,
the editor, Charles Harper writes from a social science approach and sug-
gests a particularly useful working definition of impunity:
Impunity is the means by which persons accused of crimes against
humanity escape being charged, tried and punished for criminal acts
committed with official sanction in time of war or dictatorial rule.
Impunity can be achieved through amnesty laws passed or decreed
by governments under whose authority the crimes were committed
or by a successive government. It can result from presidential par-
dons given convicted criminals who thus remain unpunished. Impu-
nity can also occur by default - the deliberate lack of any action at
all.'
3
Another contributor to this volume qualifies that:
Impunity may mean failing to do justice where human rights are
being violated, or it can be permitting crimes against creation or let-
ting jobs be cut for thousands of men and women because they are
not competitive in the free market. Impunity can take various forms
in society, but in the last analysis it always involves legitimizing
falsehood.' 4
Still, another perspective can be garnered from considering the
medico-psychiatric viewpoint. In the most extensive description uncov-
10 Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The
Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
591, 595-96 (1998).
11 Bassiouni, supra note 5, at 19.
12 See Luc Huyse, To Punish or to Pardon: A Devil's Choice, in REIGNING IN
IMPUNITY, supra note 5, at 79, 80 n.2; see also E. Muller-Rappard, A Culture of
Impunity: Rethinking the Implications for International Crimes, in REIGNING IN
IMPUNITY, supra note 5, at 91, 91.
1- Charles Harper, From Impunity to Reconciliation, in IMPUNITY: AN ETHICAL
PERSPECTIVE viii, ix (Charles Harper ed., 1996) [hereinafter IMPUNITY].
14 Raul Soza, The Church: A Witness to the Truth on the Way to Freedom, in
Impunity, supra note 13, at 60, 66.
IMPUNITY
ered in this review, Paz Rojas Baeza elucidates impunity in the following
manner:
Impunity is a human decision, an action, a behaviour, an act of
denial of concrete reality: it is an act of violence. It is an instance of
human aggression which, in addition to not being fully revealed, is
also to be left unpunished.
At the heart and origin of impunity is a crime, which is the first
thing that is to be concealed. This crime has one or several victims,
and one or several authors. It was perpetuated at a particular place,
in a precise geographical location, at a given time, on a particular day
and date. In the minds of the victims, recollections of place and time
sometimes seem a certainty and sometimes a figment of the
imagination.
With impunity, the crime and its circumstances remain anony-
mous, shrouded in the silence of the unknown.
The crime is committed in a national and international historical,
social and political context. If crimes against humanity were commit-
ted under a legal system of "State terrorism," the impunity guaran-
teed by the State during such a period would be a component factor
which aided and abetted the crime. In such a case, the authors are
the very persons who ordered or carried out the crime.
Impunity that extends into democracy or into a period of transi-
tion to democracy is different and, perhaps for that very reason, is
experienced even more dramatically by its victims. In such a case,
the human decision no longer resides in a tyrannical but in a demo-
cratic power, in which all the branches of State participate at differ-
ent levels and with different degrees of involvement, approving and
permitting it. It is the institutional structure that is compromised by
the continuation of impunity.
The attitude of an apathetic, indifferent civil society seemingly dis-
posed towards forgetting is perceived as equally aggressive. Con-
versely, a responsive attitude marked by commitment and receptivity
does engender hope.
Also part of impunity, though at a more peripheral level, are the
actions of regional or universal human rights institutions. What they
do or fail to do, say or fail to say, what they reject or accept in the
face of various impunity mechanisms such as amnesty laws, laws of
Punto Final, expiry and the use of military courts also play a part in
the hopes, wishes, frustrations and despair of the persons and fami-
lies affected.15
In this regard, impunity may be considered either the inability to prose-
cute and/or punish due to limited financial resources and a minimally-
15 Paz Rojas Baeza, Breaking the Human Link- The Medico-Psychiatric View of
Impunity, in IMPuNrry, supra note 13, at 73, 75-76.
1999]
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effective judicial system or simply a lack of political will manifested by
the exchange of amnesties or pardons borne out of the complacency of
realpolitik. Yet as Professor Diane Orentlicher warns:
[W]e would do well to resist the tendency to address the wisdom of
amnesties in terms of stark dichotomies, such as 'punish or pardon'
and 'amnesty or accountability.' These dichotomies present unduly
narrow options, detracting from more constructive efforts to balance
the demands of justice against those of reconciliation and, ultimately,
to promote reconciliation within a framework of accountability.
16
As Professor Orentlicher suggests, accountability mechanisms and
enforcement options often develop along a continuum and are not
cleanly disposed of merely by labeling one as impunity and the other
accountability. 7
The most authoritative definition to date, however, has arguably been
proffered by the United Nations ("U.N.") Special Rapporteur, Mr. Louis
Joinet. In his Report to the General Assembly regarding the problem of
impunity, Mr. Joinet summarized impunity as:
[T]he impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators
of human rights violations to account whether in criminal, civil,
administrative or disciplinary proceedings since they are not subject
to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried
and, if found guilty, convicted, and to reparations being made to
their victims.' 8
Mr. Joinet's characterization acknowledges that impunity may signal the
breakdown of enforcement mechanisms necessary to apply the securities
and protections afforded every individual through the numerous U.N.
conventions and agreements.
As this section has demonstrated, there are few, but varied, definitions
ascribed to the term impunity. And while the international community
has not selected a single definition for reference purposes, each of the
explanations recorded above offer insight into the assorted facets of
impunity. This paper began with the premise that impunity is rarely
defined due to its ubiquitous nature. This remains true. Still, each of the
works cited in this section offer guidance on the profound meaning of
impunity. From the malleable descriptions presented above, govern-
16 Diane F. Orentlicher, Swapping Amnesty for Peace and the Duty to Prosecute
Human Rights Crimes, 3 ILSA J. Ir'L & CoMP. L. 713, 714 (1996).
17 See id.
18 Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, On the Question of Impunity for Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations,
Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/6 19 July 1993, revised
by E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1994/11, revised by E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18 (final report), reprinted in
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 250, 265.
IMPUNITY
ments and NGOs faced with impunity should be able to formulate a suit-
able definition regardless of the situation encountered.
III. THE HISTORY OF IMPUNITY - INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
TREATY OBLIGATIONS
A. A Brief Primer on International Law
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.9
A credibility problem has long plagued public international law,
born of the gap between written law and practice and exacerbated by
its display on the grand stage of international affairs.20
The international legal system is a peculiar, and often ineffective, sys-
tem. This may be due in part to the fact that international law is not
"law" in the traditional legislative or penal sense. Rather, the essential
format governing international treaty relations, the primary source of
international law, is consensual - states either agree or refuse to be
bound by a particular set of rules.2 1 Despite modern attempts to discredit
a system based purely on principles of state sovereignty, sovereignty
remains the cornerstone of modern international law.22
19 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR 3d Sess, art. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/217 (III) (1948) (emphasis added). This renown and oft-repeated quote in
international human rights law is found in a document that, while lacking the inherent
force of law, was the first in a series of treaties and covenants that would become the
basis of human rights law between states and among individuals. Much of what was
originally included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has since been
subsumed into later documents that have the force and effect of law.
20 Robert 0. Weiner, Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and Practice
of Human Rights Amnesties, 26 ST. MARY'S L. J. 857, 857 (1995) (emphasis added).
21 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES §102 (1987) (describing sources of international law including custom and
general principles of law). See also Robert 0. Weiner, Trying to Make the Ends Meet:
Reconciling the Law and Practice of Human Rights Amnesties, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 857,
857 (1995) (stating that public international law has never compared well with
domestic law, because domestic law, theoretically, enjoys the ready availability of the
state's machinery to enforce its dictates).
22 See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS at 152 (2d ed. 1998)
(remarking that "[a] state-centric, sovereignty-based conception of international
order dominates international human rights as well. Most states still jealously guard
their sovereign human rights prerogatives"). See generally JACK DONNELLY,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1998) (providing a thorough study of
impunity from a social science perspective). Hurst Hannum devotes an entire chapter
to the concept of sovereignty in his book, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMODATION OF CONFLICrING RIGHTS 14 (1990).
1999]
278 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:269
No where has the drawback of sovereignty been more evident than in
the case of combating impunity for gross violations of human rights.
23
Antonio Cassese, the former President of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia, emphasized this point by acknowledg-
ing that "[tjhe reluctance of states regarding international penal
enforcement is hardly surprising, given that international criminal tribu-
nals intrude on one of the most sacred areas of state sovereignty: crimi-
nal jurisdiction.
' 24
When national governments and members of the international commu-
nity are faced with the delicate decision of whether to prosecute those
suspected of committing gross violations of human rights, the decisions
are often ensconced with questions of political stability, public support
for democracy, and, most frequently, military presence in governmental
affairs.25 As Professor Madeline Morris has observed, there are three fun-
damental reasons that governments fail to achieve full accountability:
(1) political constraints borne out of the continued need to live
and work together in a particular society;
(2) limited resources (i.e. financial, human and judicial resources);
and,
(3) a lack of political will at the national and/or international
level.26
To believe that a system based largely on consensual relations can
coerce the compliance of other resisting nations is at times naive. Only
when violations rise above a certain egregious level will the international
system attempt to intervene. Even when they do rise to that level, as they
have continued to do in places like Afghanistan, China and Cambodia,
the presence of international law will not penetrate (or attempt to pene-
trate) every border.
23 See Diane F. Orentlicher, Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment
and Victim Compensation, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT
CENTURY 425, 431-32 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994) (stating
that the hesitancy to enforce international criminal law may be partially explained by
acknowledging that it "is a lesser intrusion on sovereignty for an international body to
enunciate a norm than to insist on its enforcement - particularly when the norm
asserts duties in an area traditionally left to the broad discretion of states").
21 Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trend Towards Criminal Prosecution and
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 11
(1998).
25 See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2544-49 (1991).
26 See Madeline Morris, International Guidelines Against Impunity: Facilitating
Accountability, in REIGNING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 5, at 359, 360-61.
27 See Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to
Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 229 (1995).
IMPUNITY
However, beyond the treaty-based obligations that states accept, there
is the further obligation borne out of customary law. The Restatement of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States suggests that a state is
obligated to respect the human rights that it has accepted under treaty or
"that states generally are bound to respect as a matter of customary inter-
national law."2 As many scholars have argued, certain actions are pun-
ishable regardless of state consent, as these obligations constitute
peremptory norms of international law.29 Professor Steven R. Ratner
provides one of the most comprehensive descriptions of customary law
obligations in his recent article, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An
Inquiry in International Law.
30
Professor Cherif Bassiouni also attempts to isolate those obligations
from which no state may derogate in his article, International Crimes: Jus
Cogens and Obligatio Ergo Omnes.1 Professor Bassiouni explores the
notion that certain egregious crimes require a state to either prosecute or
extradite without exception.32  Professor Bassiouni acknowledges how-
ever, that:
The practice of states does not conform to the scholarly writings
that espouse these views. The practice of states evidences that, more
often than not, impunity has been allowed for jus cogens crimes, the
theory of universality has been far from being universally recognized
and applied, and the duty to prosecute or extradite is more inchoate
than established, other than when it arises out of specific treaty
obligations.3
Consensus on these issues is far from solidified. In addition to the dis-
parity between state sovereignty and customary law obligations, there is a
lingering assertion that culture (and not universal regard for human
rights) dictates the parameters of international criminal obligations. 4
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 701 (1987).
29 See Cassesse, supra note 24, at 6 (asserting that states should not be permitted
"to enter into international agreements or pass national legislation foregoing
punishment of [gross violations of human rights]"). See also Steven R. Ratner, New
Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87 GEo. L. J. 707,
725-27 (1999) (providing one of the most comprehensive descriptions of customary
lav obligations).
30 Ratner, supra note 29.
31 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
Omnes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 63.
32 See id. at 65-66.
33 Id. at 66. Professor Bassiouni defines the term jus cogens as "the compelling
law." Id. at 67. Bassiouni also explains that these norms hold "the highest hierarchial
position among all other norms and principles," and that "as a consequence of that
standing, jus cogens norms are deemed to be, 'peremptory,' and non-derogable." Id.
34 See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CoNTEXT 192-225 (Henry J. Steiner &
Philip Alston eds., 1996).
1999]
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This school of thought asserts that cultural relativism delimits the scope
of international law. 5 The international community's approach to gen-
der relations in certain African and Middle-Eastern countries most aptly
demonstrates this uncertainty despite the fact that many of the actions
challenged in these regions can be deemed to violate fundamental and
non-derogable human rights. The importance of cultural relativism in
accountability and impunity cannot be sufficiently underscored."6 Judge
Antonio Cassese dedicates an entire chapter to the issue of cultural rela-
tivism in his book, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD. 3 7 Likewise,
there is a section devoted to the polarities of cultural relativism in Jack
Donnelly's work, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS.38
Three recent comments on cultural relativism worthy of review are:
(1) Towards a New Universalism; Reconstruction and Dialogue,39 (2)
Human Rights and Real Cultures: Towards a Dialogue on 'Asian Values,'
40 and (3) Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over
Human Rights and Asian Values.41 In addition to these three articles,42
35 See id. The term "cultural relativism" refers to the tendency to base decisions
on whether to honor certain rights and whether to require the enforcement of certain
rights on cultural notions of propriety or acceptability. Those who would advocate a
system based on cultural relativism consider the demands of culture (often including
religious and political approaches as well) to be more vital than a system built around
individual rights and universal norms. See id. at 192-93. As noted by the editors of
this text, the relativist position "can be understood simply to assert as an empirical
matter that the world contains an impressive diversity in views about right and wrong
that is linked to the diverse underlying cultures." See id. The countries comprising
the Asian region have frequently resorted to cultural relativism when challenged on
human rights practices.
36 See Diane F. Orentlicher, International Criminal Law and the Cambodian
Killing Fields, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L., 705, 707. As Professor Orentlicher sagely
reminds, "[we] surely would not want to defer to cultural-relativist arguments
counseling against accountability when the culture in question is one of wholesale
impunity. A key aim of trials following sweeping violations of personal integrity is to
help dispel the culture of impunity that enabled the crimes to occur. In some respects,
then, the demands of universal justice may in fact require some measure of meddling
with patterns of national crime." Id.
37 See ANTONIO CASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD at 48-67
(1990). Chapter 3 is entitled Are Human Rights Truly Universal. See id. at 48.
38 See DONNELLY, supra note 22, at 32-35.
39 Adamantia Pollis: Towards a New Universalism: Reconstruction and Dialogue, 16
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 5 (1998).
40 Michael Freeman, Human Rights and Real Cultures: Towards a Dialogue on
Asian Values, 16 NETH. Q. Hum. R. 25 (1998).
41 Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate Over
Human Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 109 (1998).
42 See also R. P. Peerenboom, What's Wrong With Chinese Rights?: Toward a
Theory of Rights with Chinese Characteristics, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29 (1993)
(commenting on cultural relativism).
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numerous books discuss the subject of human rights from the uniquely
Asian perspective. Among the more noteworthy efforts are: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC,43 ASIAN
PERSPECrIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS,44 and THE EAST AsiAN CHALLENGE
FOR HuMAN RIGHTS. 45 Despite constant reference to what "the law"
requires, it is important to realize that the international legal system
remains an amalgamation of law, politics, culture and the countervailing
interests of state-sovereignty. Even if international law is considered
merely a goal to be achieved, the norms are developing fortitude. As
Professor Diane Orentlicher notes in her seminal work, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, "[i]n
the absence of effective enforcement machinery, international law's
power to induce compliance with its prescriptions turns on the strength of
the norms themselves. 46
B. The Governing Treaties
Despite any apparent flaws in the enforcement of international law,
there is no shortage of treaties and declarations purporting to establish
minimum standards of behavior under international law. In the after-
math of World War II, the victorious Allied forces joined twenty-six other
nations in establishing the United Nations." Today this body continues
to govern and regulate many of the relations between states by assisting
in the formulation and regulation of multilateral treaties.48 Several such
treaties have emerged since the Nuremberg Principles affirmatively
43 See HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
(James T. H. Tang ed., 1995).
44 See ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Claude E. Welch, Jr., & Virginia
A. Leary eds., 1990).
45 See THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer &
Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999).
46 Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 2594. Although significant time has passed since
the drafting of Professor Orentlicher's article, it is one of the foundational works on
impunity and prosecution in transitional settings, and may provide an important
resource for any individual desiring to understand the basics of impunity in
transitional settings and the countervailing requirement for prosecution or
punishment. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
47 The term "United Nations" was coined by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
of the United States. See GnoFFmEY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 67 (1994)
(observing that "[t]he establishment of the United Nations Organization in 1945 was
the central act of recognition by the war-surviving generation that something striking
had to be done to avoid the recurrence of such disasters").
48 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. The resort to treaties requires
that the target state be party to the treaty; however, in certain instances, customary
law will be available even against those states who have opted out of a particular
treaty. See id.
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established the prominence of human rights in international relations.
Nuremberg, more than any other single event, "marked the beginning of
the International Human Rights Movement."49 Consequently, as Juan
M6ndez has observed, "[a] strong legal argument can be made for an
emerging principle in international law that states have affirmative obli-
gations in response to massive and systematic violations of fundamental
rights."50 This section will briefly describe those treaties and regional
agreements underlying this emerging principle.
1. The Genocide Convention
When the world community finally realized the true sinister nature of
Nazi atrocities committed during World War II, great advancements in
international criminal law began to appear. Chief among these was the
drafting and adoption of the Genocide Convention.5' Currently, 129
states are party to the Genocide Convention which condemns genocide
"whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, [as] a crime under
international law which [each State Party] undertake[s] to prevent and to
punish., 52  The Genocide Convention unequivocally requires that
"[p]ersons charged with genocide.., shall be tried by a competent tribu-
nal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction .... ,,1 Despite
the clarity of this requirement, the Genocide Convention has not ade-
quately protected citizens of countries such as Cambodia, Rwanda and
East Timor.54 Further, the term genocide has a narrow legal definition
and [only] encompasses killings and serious physical or mental injuries
inflicted "with [the] intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, eth-
nical, racial or religious group, as such."55 Although the Genocide Con-
vention remains only one tool in an assortment of prohibitions against
gross violations of human rights, a consideration of genocidal acts must
begin by referencing this 1948 document.
19 Henry King, Jr., Commentary: The Modem Relevance of the Nuremberg
Principles, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279, 279-80 (1997).
50 Juan Mdndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTs. Q. 255, 259 (1997).
51 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951)
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]. See also generally LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION
OF GENOCIDE at 8-22 (1985) (discussing the Genocide Convention).
52 Genocide Convention, supra note 51.
53 Genocide Convention, supra note 51, art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280-82.
54 This remains true despite the fact that Cambodia ratified the Genocide
Convention on Oct. 14, 1950. See Genocide Convention, supra note 51, 78 U.N.T.S.
at 278 n.1.
9- Genocide Convention, supra note 5, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280. The phrase "as
such" is not superfluous and has spurred much legal commentary. The nuances
regarding this phraseology (and any attempted explanation thereof), however, is far
beyond the limited scope of this article.
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Several noteworthy articles expound on the Genocide Convention
requirements and its applicability or inapplicability in certain situations.
Of particular importance are Leo Kuper's THE PREVENT'ON OF GENO-
CIDE,516 Michael Scharf's The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the Interna-
tional Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 7 Hurst
Hannum's International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of
Silence,5" Payam Akhavan's Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A
Challenge to Civilization,59 and, Cherif Bassiouni's The Normative Frame-
work of International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambigui-
ties.6" In addition, Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams provide an
excellent description of State obligations under the Genocide Convention
in their book entitled Accou NABxrry FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATRoci-
TIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.
61
2. The Convention Against Torture
Another fundamental source of human rights protection is the Conven-
tion Against Torture.62 This U.N. document, ratified by 114 States, offi-
cially came into force on 26 June 1987.63 This Convention, which outlaws
torture committed at any time,64 requires that State Parties either prose-
56 See LEO KUPER, TH PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE (1985) (presenting a solid
portrayal of the concept of genocide from a social science perspective).
67 See Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, L. & CoNTEmp. PROB., Autumn 1996,
at 41 (discussing the legal obligations to prosecute gross violations of human rights
and providing a complete, but succinct, overview of such obligations and their
genesis).
58 See Hurst Hannum, International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of
Silence, 11 HUM. RTs. Q. 82 (1989) (providing a thorough assessment of the Genocide
Convention and its potential application to Cambodia).
59 See Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to
Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 229 (1995).
60 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International
Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoN~rEMP.
PROBS. 199 (1998).
61 See STVEwN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMs, AcCOuNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCIIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24-41 (1997) (offering one of the most
outstanding works on accountability and impunity in the Asian context, providing, not
only legal advice and analysis, but also the cognizant realities faced by those
attempting accountability in Cambodia, and explaining the unique situation posed by
the Khmer Rouge regime and its continued legacy).
62 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/
39/51 (1984) 1465 U.N.T.S. 112 (entered into force 26 June 1987) [hereinafter
Convention Against Torture].
63 See id.
64 See id. Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Convention Against Torture explicitly
confirms that "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
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cute or extradite any person, found within its territory, who is alleged to
have committed torture.65
The Convention Against Torture requires that:
Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he
has been subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction
has the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and
impartially examined by, its competent authorities.
66
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of
an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair
and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabili-
tation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result
of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to
compensation.67
These requirements supplement any national protections afforded.68
Numerous scholars have emphasized the applicability of this Convention
in cases of transitional justice and impunity. Of particular relevance are
Anne F. Bayefsky's article, Making the Human Rights Treaties Work
69
and Christopher C. Joyner's piece entitled Redressing Impunity for
Human Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search for
Accountability.
70
3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Further protections for the victims of gross violations of human rights
may be found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"). 7" This broad document protects numerous human rights and
is not limited to gross violations as seen in the more specialized treaties
referenced above.72 However, the ICCPR maintains an interpretive body
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture." Id. Further, Article 2, paragraph 3 specifies
that "[a]n order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a
justification of torture." Id.
65 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 62, art. 7, para. 1.
66 Convention Against Torture, supra note 62, art. 13.
67 Id. art. 14, para. 1.
68 Id. art. 14, para. 2.
69 Anne F. Bayefsky, Making the Human Rights Treaties Work, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
AN AGENDA FOR THE NExT CENTURY 229 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence
Hargrove eds., 1994).
70 See Joyner, supra note 10, at 604-07.
71 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
72 See Genocide Convention, supra note 51; see also Convention Against Torture,
supra note 62.
at the U.N. devoted solely to violations of this covenant.73 In relation to
impunity, "[t]he United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is the
authoritative interpreter of the ICCPR, has said that blanket amnesty
laws and pardons are inconsistent with the Covenant because they create
'a climate of impunity' and deny the victims this 'right to a remedy.' , 74
For a thorough description of a State's obligation to prosecute individuals
suspected of committing torture, extra-legal executions and disappear-
ances, under the ICCPR and customary law, see Diane F. Orentlicher's
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime.7 5
4. The Geneva Conventions of 1949
Beyond the U.N. documents cited above, the area of impunity is fur-
ther curtailed by reference to four separate agreements commonly
referred to as the "Geneva Conventions of 1949.' ,7' These conventions
emanate from the World War II atrocities, but have their roots in other
pseudo-legal instruments predating Nazi Germany.77 As Michael Scharf
notes, "[t]he four Geneva Conventions were negotiated in 1949 to codify
the international rules relating to the treatment of prisoners of war and
civilians in occupied territory., 7s The codification of these principles
occurred at the impetus of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
73 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 71.
74 Mrndez, supra note 50, at 259.
75 See Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 2569-76 (providing a useful reference
regarding a State's duties under the Genocide Convention, the Convention Against
Torture, the American Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention on
Human Rights and customary law).
76 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (collectively referred to as "the Geneva
Conventions of 1949").
77 See generally Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in
the Former Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 783, 787-90 (1995) (explaining that the
failure of various Geneva Conventions prior to 1949 to establish a strong system for
repression of breaches of their provisions, in addition to the horrors of World War II,
led to a new system of repression incorporated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
78 Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute
International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 Tnx. INT'L L. J. 1, 20 (1996). Professor Scharf also
notes that virtually every country in the world is party to the Geneva Conventions.
See id.
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and this Committee remains as the most authoritative source for interpre-
tations of the obligations set forth therein.
79
Parties to the Geneva Conventions have a legal duty to search for,
prosecute and punish those individuals suspected of committing grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions.8" Each Convention delineates the
term "grave breaches," which may include such acts as willful killing, tor-
ture or inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or serious
bodily injury.8' The main limitation of these documents, however, is that
their jurisdictional scope is largely limited to instances of international
armed conflict.82 "[C]onflicts of a 'non-international character' are regu-
lated .. .by a single article common to all four conventions, common
Article 3."83 While a full review of the Conventions is far beyond the
scope of this article, it is important to note that the influence of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 continues to grow. Evidence of this increas-
ing influence may be seen in two recent statutes governing the Interna-
tional Tribunals at the Hague84 and Arusha.85
Oren Gross's article, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Con-
ffict in the Former Yugoslavia,86 and Cherif Bassiouni's article, The Nor-
mative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps
19 But see id. (explaining that the Commentary to the Geneva Conventions is the
official history of the negotiations leading to the adoption of these treaties).
80 See Scharf, supra note 78, at 20. The only permissible exception to punishment
is extradition. See id. Professor Scharf contends that the Commentary to the Geneva
Conventions "confirms that the obligation to prosecute is 'absolute,' meaning, inter
alia, that state-parties can under no circumstances grant perpetrators immunity or
amnesty from prosecution for grave breaches under the Conventions." Id.
81 See Gross, supra note 77, at 797-800. These three acts, Mr. Gross explains, are
the only acts prohibited under each of the four separate documents. See id. at 798. In
addition, the Geneva Conventions characterize the following acts as grave breaches:
the extensive destruction of property not justified by military necessity, compelling a
prisoner of war to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, willfully denying a prisoner of
war a fair trial, unlawful deportation or transfer of a protected person, unlawful
confinement of a protected person, and the taking of hostages. Id.
82 See Scharf, supra note 78, at 20.
83 Bassiouni, supra note 60, at 202.
84 See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1159 (1993) (providing additional information regarding the Yugoslav Tribunal at the
Hague).
85 See generally S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
(providing the International Tribunal's statutory response, attached as an addendum
to this resolution, to the genocidal acts in Rwanda).
86 See Gross, supra note 77, at 783.
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and Ambiguities, 7 provide good descriptions of the obligations that the
Geneva Conventions impose.
5. Regional Instruments
Perhaps the most hopeful aspiration for the enforcement of interna-
tional obligations under human rights treaties are embodied in the
regional enforcement systems. Currently, there are three regional sys-
tems of protection: one each in Europe,88 the Americas89 and Africa.90
Conspicuously absent in this arena is a system or sub-system regulating
activities in the Asian-Pacific region. This omission discounts the impor-
tance of regional systems in protecting the rights of residents within each
system. Further, resort to regional systems or sub-systems diminishes the
impediment that cultural relativism otherwise presents. In this section,
brief attention will be given to the Inter-American system and its exem-
plary handling of impunity issues in Latin American countries during the
1980's.
Latin America provides some of the more salient examples of both
how to respond to gross violations of human rights and how to avoid
international obligations for such violations. It is for this reason, perhaps,
that much of the literature on impunity focuses on the Latin American
countries of South and Central America.9" This notoriety has not
escaped the attention of the Inter-American system. Rather, the Inter-
American system should be credited with the most dedicated and pro-
gressive approach to combating gross violations of human rights.
87 See Bassiouni, supra note 60.
88 See generally THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Francis G.
Jacobs & Robin C. A. White eds., 1996) (providing information regarding the
European system of protection); see also European Court of Human Rights, The
European Court of Human Rights Home Page (visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.
dhcour.coe.fr>.
89 The Inter-American system covers all of North America, Central America,
South America and many of the surrounding island territories. See THOMAs
BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HuMAN RGHTS IN THE AMERICAS:
CASES AND M ATEIALs (4th ed. 1995) (describing the Inter-American system and
including many cases decided by the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights); see also Organization of American States, The
Organization of American States (visited Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.oas.org>
(providing additional information regarding the Organization of American States, the
governing body of the Inter-American system, analogous to the United Nations).
90 See generally EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HuMAN
AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (1996) (providing additional information regarding the
African system and the only coverage to date regarding the African Commission on
Human and People's Rights).
91 See, e.g., AMNsTY INTERNATIONAL, supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; see
also Joyner, supra note 10 and accompanying text (providing examples of literature
discussing impunity and focusing on Latin American countries).
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The case of Argentina remains one of the most discussed cases of
impunity in transitional justice.92 Raul Alfosin was inaugurated as Presi-
dent of Argentina on 10 December 1983, after nearly eight years of
"exceptionally cruel" military rule. Although President Alfonsin
eagerly approached the issue of accountability by appointing a commis-
sion to investigate military atrocities, his human rights policies quickly
began to wane.94 Argentina initially attempted criminal trials for nine
upper-level junta members while public support was still strong.9 5 As
time progressed however, the military regained its strength and began to
challenge the application of law to military atrocities committed during
the "dirty war" against subversion.9 6 In response to this clamor, Presi-
dent Alfonsin presented two laws to Congress, the Ley de Punto Final
(Full Stop Law) and the Due Obedience Law, that effectively insulated
most military members from prosecution. 7 Challenges to these laws
were presented to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.9"
During this same time period, Uruguay was dealing with its own transi-
tion to democratic rule. Utilizing a different approach than Argentina,
Uruguay eventually permitted its amnesty law to be resolved by popular
vote.99 The Ley de Caducidad was upheld by a vote of 58% to 42%, and
military officials were granted full immunity from prosecution.
1 °0
Despite this seemingly "democratic" approach to impunity, there were
several people who remained dissatisfied with the amnesties afforded by
the government. 10' Accordingly, at least eight individuals filed petitions
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights challenging the
Uruguayan impunity law.'0 2
92 The discussion of the Argentinean example produced several divergent
responses. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 23; Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish
Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J.
2619 (1991); Diane Orentlicher, A Reply to Professor Nino, 100 YALE L.J. 2641
(1991).
93 ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 35 (1998).
94 See id. at 35-37.
95 See id. at 35-36.




l10 See Jose Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by
Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in STATE
CRIMES, supra note 1, at 62-3, reprinted in 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 623 (1990). It is
interesting to note that voting was mandatory for Uruguayans, with the voters being
asked to choose green (no amnesty) or yellow (thereby upholding the amnesty law).




Both cases proceeded to the Commission and separate decisions were
rendered on October 2, 1992.103 In each instance, the Commission found
that the respective amnesty provisions violated each country's obligations
under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
("American Declaration") and the American Convention on Human
Rights ("American Convention"). The language in these decisions dem-
onstrates some of the fundamental problems with impunity. In the case
involving Argentina, the Commission noted that:
The effect of the passage of the Laws and Decrees was to cancel all
proceedings pending against those responsible for past human rights
violations. These measures closed off any judicial possibility of con-
tinuing the criminal trials intended to establish the crimes
denounced; identify their authors, accomplices and accessories after
the fact, and impose the corresponding punishments. The petition-
ers, relatives or those injured by the human rights violations have
been denied their right to a recourse, to a thorough and impartial
judicial investigation to ascertain the facts.
Under Article 1.1 of the [American] Convention, the State Parties
are obliged "to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein
and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and
full exercise of those rights and freedoms.. .. "
The Laws and the Decree [of amnesty] sought to, and effectively
did obstruct, the exercise of the petitioners' right [to a fair trial]."i 4
In a similar fashion, the Commission found that Uruguay had violated
the American Declaration and the American Convention by passing an
amnesty, notwithstanding the nuance that the Uruguayan amnesty had
been "approved" by the voting public. The Commission characterized
the amnesty provision in the following manner:
The law in question had the intended effect of dismissing all crimi-
nal proceedings involving past human rights violations. With that,
the law eliminates any judicial possibility of a serious and impartial
103 See TRANSITIONAL JUsTICE, VOL. III, supra note 3, at 533 (discussing the case
of Argentina), 605 (discussing the case of Uruguay).
104 Id. at 536. The Commission found, in addition to this violation, that Argentina
had violated the petitioner's right to judicial protection and right of assembly. See id.
at 536. The Commission further noted that a state's obligation to investigate certain
human rights violations is breached when the state passes an amnesty, foreclosing any
need to investigate. See id. Without resorting to prosecutions, many instances of
disappearances and torture would not be investigated as required by the American
Convention on Human Rights. See id. Again, it must be emphasized that these
decisions were grounded in regional requirements to ensure certain fundamental
human rights and that the international response has been less forceful. See id. at 533-
38.
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investigation designed to establish the crimes denounced and to
identify their authors, accomplices, and accessories after the fact.
The Commission must also consider the fact that in Uruguay, no
national investigatory commission was ever set up nor was there any
official report on the very grave human right violations committed
during the previous de facto government.
What is denounced as incompatible with the Convention are the
legal consequences of the law with respect to the right to a fair trial.
One of the law's effects was to deny the victim or his rightful claim-
ant the opportunity to participate in the criminal proceedings, which
is the appropriate means to investigate the commission of the crimes
denounced, determine criminal liability and impose punishment on
those responsible, their accomplices and accessories after the fact. 10 5
In both cases, the Commission found that the respective amnesty law
violated the right to a fair trial and the right to assembly.' 0 6 Both of these
examples provide guidance on precisely why impunity is considered by
many to be unlawful. As discussed in the introductory section of this
paper, silence is the most effective means by which dictators and torturers
secure the success of their endeavors. Forced silence, via impunity, is
unacceptable and merely serves to perpetuate the cycles of violence
infecting our modern world. Even where the issues raised before the
Commission were presented in an international setting, many of the same
guarantees (the right to a remedy, the right to a fair trial and the right to
peaceably assemble) exist in international treaties.10 7 The use of torture
and extra-judicial killings to quash such rights is prohibited by interna-
tional law' 08
Finally, the Honduran case of Velasquez-Rodriguez is instructive as it
remains one of the few judicial determinations that States owe a duty to
individuals to protect them from torture and disappearances.'0 9 As the
Inter-American Court noted:
The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent
human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry
out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdic-
1o5 Id. at 608-09.
106 See id.
107 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 71.
108 See id
109 See TR'AsrrioNAL JUSTICE, VOL. III, supra note 3, 174, at 588; see also
Organization of American States, supra note 89; 1988 ANN. REP. INTER-AM. C. H. R.
35.
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tion, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punish-
ment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation." 0
This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political,
administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of
human rights and ensure that any violations are considered and
treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the punishment of
those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims for
damages.
The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a
violation of the rights protected by the Convention. If the State
apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished and
the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as soon as
possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the
free and full exercise of those rights to the persons within its jurisdic-
tion. The same is true when the State allows private persons or
groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights
recognized by the Convention.'
As can be seen from this language, much advancement has occurred in
the Inter-American system both in terms of establishing behavioral
norms and in providing individual protection for gross violations of
human rights. The Velasquez-Rodriguez case remains a staple in impu-
nity literature and will likely continue to be the benchmark for judicial
determinations in future cases of State-sanctioned impunity.
Further reading regarding the Latin American attempts to deal with
accountability can be found in Lawrence Weschler's moving book, A
MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETrLING AccouNTs WiTH TORTURERS, which
recalls the respective transitions to democracy in Brazil and Uruguay." 2
Additional significant writings regarding Latin American approaches to
accountability and the Inter-American system are Jack Donnelly's book
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, n1 3 Douglass Cassel's piece, Lessons
from the Americas: Guidelines for International Responses to Amnesties
for Atrocities,"4 Juan M6ndez's article entitled The Right to Truth, 5
110 TRnANsrrioNAL JUSTICE, VOL. III, supra note 3, 174, at 588 (emphasis added);
see also Organization of American States, supra note 89; 1988 ANN. REP. INTER-AM.
C. H. R. 35.
111 TRANSrIONAL JUSTICE, VOL. III, supra note 3, 175-76, at 588 (emphasis
added).
112 See generally LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETrLING
AccouNTs WITH TORTURERS (1990) (discussing Latin American approaches to
accountability).
113 See DONNELLY, supra note 22, at 39-55 (providing a good survey of the
Southern Cone experience from a social sciences perspective).
114 See generally Douglass Cassel, Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for
International Responses to Amnesties for Atrocities, LAW & CoTrEMP. PROBS.,
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Robert 0. Weiner's Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and
Practice of Human Rights Amnesties," 6 and Naomi Roht-Arriaza's influ-
ential piece, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave
Human Rights Violations in International Law.
117
C. Historical Instances of Impunity
Any discussion regarding the historical development of impunity is
patently absent at this point. To enable the student of impunity to fully
comprehend the depth of this conundrum, this section briefly presents the
historical antecedents of modem-day impunity. Ironically, the appear-
ance of impunity and the development of international criminal law coin-
cide in both time and fortitude. The first instance of these all too often
complementary doctrines occurred in the aftermath of World War 1.118
Many are familiar with the term "Nuremberg" and are familiar with its
moral and legal legacies. The mere utterance of this name conjures up an
assortment of ideas, hopes, disappointments and notions relating to jus-
tice. Yet very few people are familiar with Nuremberg's predecessor,
Leipzig. For all that Nuremberg represents in terms of success, Leipzig
proffers in terms of failure. Immediately following World War I, the vic-
torious Allies assembled to discuss the fate of those most responsible for
war atrocities.1 9 The two main topics of discussion were what to do
about the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, and what to do about the Turkish
Autumn 1996, at 197 (offering analysis of the amnesties and transitional reckonings in
El Salvador, Uruguay, Chile, Guatemala and Haiti).
-11 See Juan E. Mdndez, The Right to Truth, in REIGNING IN IMPUNITY, supra note
5 at 255 (reminding that:
From the start, those who fought against impunity looked to international law
to find supportive arguments. Although the analogies with Nuremberg were not
completely satisfactory, it was clear that, since the end of the Second World War,
international law has established principles of great utility: the obligation to
punish genocide; the obligation to make torture punishable in domestic law; the
duty to punish war crimes under the Geneva Conventions; the several references
to universal jurisdiction regarding international crimes; the inapplicability of
obedience to orders as a defense (in the case of manifestly illegal orders); the
non-applicability of a statute of limitations to crimes against humanity; the
inapplicability of the political crime defense in the case of extradition for such
crimes; and, the obligation to extradite or prosecute).
Id.
116 See Weiner, supra note 20.
117 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute
Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 451, 467-74.
118 See generally KELLY D. ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION
IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 40-45 (1997).
119 See GEORGE CREEL, WAR CRIMINALS AND PUNISHMENT 122-37 (1944).
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massacres of numerous Armenians.12 ° Despite three separate articles
appearing in the Treaty of Versailles addressing the need for an ad hoc
criminal tribunal and an agreement that charges were to be brought
against the Turkish architects of the mass killings, no action was taken
against these two key targets of accountability.12'
Instead, after convening a "Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of War and On Enforcement Penalties," the Allies submitted a
list of eight hundred and ninety-six suspected war criminals to Ger-
many.122 Germany steadfastly refused to accept such broad prosecutions
and threatened the renewal of war.123 Rather than risk the return to war,
the Allies reevaluated their position and sent a second list of suspects that
had been narrowed to a mere forty-five suspects. 24 Germany again pro-
tested and eventually agreed to prosecute twelve suspects before the Ger-
man Supreme Court at Leipzig. 125 These domestic prosecutions resulted
in only four convictions with sentences ranging from six months to two
years.
126
The events at Leipzig culminated in the withdrawal of Allied Observers
in Leipzig.' 27 Only a few minor prosecutions continued against the initial
target groups in Belgium and France. 12 The experience at Leipzig con-
vincingly demonstrated that the domestic courts of defeated nations
could not be entrusted with the difficult task of prosecuting their own war
criminals. 29 The ambivalence noted at Leipzig, and its corresponding
desire to "keep the peace" rather than seek justice, has been replayed in
numerous settings since the initial debacle following World War .1 0 In
fact, Hitler himself relied upon the international community's inertia fol-
lowing World War I in proclaiming, "Who after all is today speaking
120 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 11, 15-17 (1997).
121 See id. at 17-18.
122 See DONALD A. WELLS, WAR CRIMES AND LAWS OF WAR 69-70 (1984).






129 See 2 BENJAMIN FERENCZ, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW: A WAY To
WORLD PEACE 439 (1983).
13o See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 17-18
(1992). Beginning with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the award of amnesty to
defeated forces has often been the political price paid for achieving a cessation of
hostilities. See id.
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about the destruction of the Armenians?"'' Leipzig, Professor Bas-
siouni notes, is the first instance where political concerns prevailed over
justice.1
3 2
While many would credit the experience at Nuremberg with the crea-
tion of an enforceable body of human rights standards, an equally plausi-
ble argument exists that the modern approach towards human rights
owes its genesis not to Nuremberg, but rather, to the failures experienced
at Leipzig.' 3 As one scholar notes, "[t]he silence of international law
regarding the consequences for government-sponsored abuses of human
rights began to change after the First World War, and even more so after
World War II.,'
134
IV. ASIAN EXAMPLES OF IMPUNITY




Nearly every author that speaks of impunity makes reference to the
renowned case of Cambodia. 36 Indeed, it would be a gross omission to
ignore the legacy of the Khmer Rouge regime. Perhaps more than any
other example - Asian or otherwise - Cambodia demonstrates the
fragile relation between political will and political casualties.
Three fine articles relating to Cambodia and the Khmer Rogue are
Hurst Hannum's International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The
Sounds of Silence,'37 Craig Etcheson's The Persistence of Impunity in
Cambodia3 ' and Theresa Klosterman's The Feasibility and Propriety of a
131 Bassiouni, supra note 120, at 21 n.30 (quoting Adolph Hitler in his speech to
the Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals on the Obersalzberg on 22
August 1939).
132 See id. at 17.
133 See CREEL, supra note 118, at 138-50.
134 Steven R. Ratner, Why Only War Crimes?: De-Linking Human Rights Offenses
from Armed Conflict, 3 HOFsTRA L. & POL'Y. SYMP. 75, 78 (1999). This article
appears in a symposium publication entitled War Crimes and War Crimes Tribunals:
Past, Present and Future, and is one of several articles offering comments and
observations on preventing genocide and gender violence in general, while indirectly
addressing the subject of impunity. See generally 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP.
(1999).
135 MARTHA MINoW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 146 (1998) (emphasis added).
136 See, e.g., LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE at 14-16 (1985).
137 See Hannum, supra note 58, at 82.
138 See CRAIG ETCHESON, The Persistence of Impunity in Cambodia, in REIGNING
IN IMPUNITY, supra note 5, at 231.
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Truth Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?139 Likewise,
Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams's book, ACCOUNTABILYiY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATRocrrs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,140 presents a thor-
ough and meticulous study of the Khmer Rouge's activities and Cambo-
dia's corresponding obligations under international law.
"From the start," Klosterman observes, "secrecy was the modus oper-
andi of the Khmer Rouge."' 41 It is a great paradox, then, that secrecy
(or simply ambivalent complicity) permitted the Khmer Rouge to hold
the Cambodian seat at the U.N. during the 1980s.14 Today, due in part
to vigilant reporting from such organizations as the Yale Documentation
Center and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the brutality of
Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge are no longer secret.
143
The Khmer Rouge regime targeted ethnic Chams (people of Malayo-
Polynesian descent who practiced the Islamic religion), Buddhist monks,
officials of the prior regime, the educated and any other individual who
was not deemed "pure Khmer."144 As Hurst Hannum notes:
The radical transformation of Cambodia envisaged by the Khmer
Rouge required the racial, social, ideological, and political purifica-
tion of the Cambodian nation, through the sociological and physical
liquidation of a variety of groups considered to be irremediably
tainted by their association with the old social order or otherwise
unsuited to the intended new order. To achieve this goal, the Khmer
139 See Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth Commission
in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & Com'. L. 833 (1998).
140 See RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 61, at 1.
141 Klosterman, supra note 139, at 846.
142 See RATNER & ABP.AMs, supra note 61, at 239 (noting that, "[t]his sad
development resulted from an effective anti-Vietnam coalition led by China and
ASEAN, and supported by the United States (due to the Cold War), as well as many
Third World nations who placed a premium on the need to condemn aggression
against small states").
143 See generally FLOYD ABRAMS ET AL., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
KAmPUCHEA: AFrER Tim WORST (1985), reprinted in 1989 (providing a report of two
separate fact finding missions along the Thai-Kampuchean border in 1984 and early
1985), and JAMES Ross, LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CAMBODIA: THE
JUSTICE SSYSTEM AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1991) (providing a report of
a Cambodian fact finding mission in late 1991).
144 See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 143, at 234-36; see also Hannum, supra note 58,
at 86-88. Mr. Hannum declares that "[b]y the end of the effective Khmer Rouge rule
in 1979, Buddhism had been completely destroyed as an organized religion and its
monks substantially destroyed physically." Hannum, supra note 58, at 88. Mr.
Hannum further estimates that less than one thousand (1,000) monks survived the
Khmer Rouge regime, but that prior to the institution of Khmer Rouge proscriptions
against religious worship, Cambodia maintained approximately 60,000 Buddhist
monks. See Hannum, supra note 58, at 86-88.
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Rouge government instituted unremitting, absolute dictatorship over
a populace ruled by terror.
145
While not all of the acts committed by the Khmer Rouge regime
amount to genocide, there is more than sufficient evidence that certain
groups were targeted due solely to their racial, ethnic or religious heri-
tage.' 46 The fact that Cambodia ratified the Genocide Convention with-
out reservation on 14 October 1950 has had little impact on subsequent
legal developments. 147 In fact, the international community's failure to
act against the Khmer Rouge regime is a deplorable commentary on the
impotency of the Genocide Convention against such forces as political
will and apathy.'
48
The most unfathomable aspect of Khmer Rouge impunity is the fact
that the regime kept detailed, meticulous records of their executions and
torture committed at Tuol Sleng prison and elsewhere. 49 Unlike the evi-
dentiary void confronting the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Pol
Pot's regime left behind a wealth of incriminating information matched
only by the architects of Nazi Germany.' Further, these records affirm-
atively demonstrate that the prison, torture and execution centers were
"so much more macabre than political prisons or torture centers in other
countries that the survivor accounts would be unbelievable were it not for
the extraordinary archival documentation.'
' 51
Only once did Cambodia attempt to bring members of the Khmer
Rouge regime to justice, when the people's revolutionary tribunal con-
ducted in abstenia trials against Pol Pot and his deputy Prime Minister.
15 2
145 Hannum, supra note 58, at 85.
146 See id.
'I See id. at 94.
148 See Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to
Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 229, 230 (1995). Akhavan also states that:
[Diespite its preeminent juridical status, this monstrous crime - which world
leaders vowed would never happen again - continues to plague mankind. Since
the Holocaust, genocidal acts have been permitted against numerous human
groups before the passive eyes of the international community. The questions
are, therefore, what are the means for the enforcement of the Genocide
Convention and why has the international community repeatedly failed to
prevent and punish this horrid crime? ... The failure to prevent and punish
genocide betrays a lack of political will to confront effectively the intentional
mass destruction of entire human groups. The lack of political will, in turn,
betrays a cynical and short-sighted policy on the part of world leaders that fails to
comprehend the immense moral and political consequences of inaction against
such gross abuses of power.
Id.
149 See Hannum, supra note 58.
150 See Klosterman, supra note 139, at 833, 849-50.
151 Hannum, supra note 58, at 91.
152 See KUPER, supra note 56, at 17.
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Despite the fact that both were adjudged guilty (with less than full due
process), neither was taken into government custody or forced to serve
any sentence.153 Most recently, a full amnesty was provided to leng Sary,
second in command of the Khmer Rouge.
1 5 4
The only glimmer of hope that impunity might be averted in Cambodia
came in 1994 when the United States Congress adopted the Cambodian
Genocide Justice Act.155 The purpose of the Cambodian Genocide Act
was two-fold:
(1) to collect relevant data relating to crimes of genocide commit-
ted in Cambodia between 17 April 1975 and 7 January 1979,156
and
(2) in circumstances which the President deems appropriate, to
encourage the establishment of a national or international crimi-
nal tribunal for the prosecution of those accused of genocide in
Cambodia. 57
While no tribunal has been created, and may never materialize, the law
did assist in the creation of a Cambodian Document Center originally
maintained at Yale University.5 This important development has per-
mitted the retrieval of numerous incriminating documents, photographic
evidence and physical surveys of genocidal enclaves.
Despite the death of Pol Pot and the advanced age of his many collabo-
rators, the Cambodian issue seems far from resolved. As recently as 16
April 1998, a U.N. Special Representative, Mr. Thomas Hammarberg,
emphasized the need to establish justice in Cambodia.'59 "Injecting jus-
tice and accountability for the Khmer Rouge period," he reminded, "is an
important step in breaking the cycle of impunity which even today
remains a major problem in Cambodia."1 ' For now however, Cambodia
stands as one of the preeminent examples of continuing impunity against
unredressed crimes.
153 See id. at 17 (stating that the criminal proceedings conducted by the people's
revolutionary tribunal tried Pol Pot and the deputy prime minister in abstentia).
154 See RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 61, at 241.
155 Cambodian Genocide Justice Act §§ 572-74, 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (1994).
156 Id. (indicating that the purpose for collection of this data was the potential use




159 See Need to Inject Justice and Accountability for Khmer Rouge Period Remains
After Death of Pol Pot, Special Representative of Secretary-General Says, U.N. PREss
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B. The Philippines
In 1986, the "People Power Revolution" signaled a hopeful moment in
the history of the Philippines because it was seen as an indication that
political and civil liberties would be restored.' 6 ' For it was with this
Revolution that Ferdinand Marcos relinquished power and was replaced
by a more promising candidate, Corazon Aquino.'62 Prior to his depar-
ture, Marcos presided over a government that inflicted fierce violations of
human rights over an extended period of martial law. 6' Numerous vic-
tims perished under the Marcos regime where more than 50,000 individu-
als were unlawfully imprisoned, more than 1,000 were killed for political
reasons, and many more were subjected to torture or were "disap-
peared."' 64 Indeed, "[w]hile numbers and specific cases have been dis-
puted, there is no serious question that for more than a decade military
personnel in the Philippines have repeatedly killed [tortured and "disap-
peared"] persons seized as alleged subversives, as well as other people
against whom no particular charges [were ever] even preliminarily
formulated."' 65
Beyond the crimes committed against life and physical and mental
security, the Marcos regime also inflicted gross violations of human rights
by issuing a Presidential Commitment Order ("PCO") permitting "pre-
ventative detention" for national security crimes and suspending habeas
corpus in national security cases. 66 The Filipino Courts acted in collu-
sion with Marcos by finding that they were incapable of reviewing Presi-
dent Marcos' exercise of power relating to arrest and detention.
67
The inauguration of President Aquino was broadly welcomed as she
was considered to be sympathetic to human rights.'6 8 Initially, President
Aquino held true to her commitments on human rights by releasing a
significant number of political prisoners, restoring habeas corpus, ratify-
ing important human rights instruments (such as the ICCPR referenced
above), repealing those decrees permitting arbitrary and indefinite deten-
tion and instituting a national Truth Commission to investigate past
161 See The Philippines: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides, ASIA WATCH,
1990, at 2.
162 See id.
163 See Marvin E. Frankel, Jack Greenberg & Diane F. Orentlicher, The
Philippines, A Country in Crisis: A Report by the Lawyers Committee for
International Human Rights, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 69 (1983).
164 Id. at 71, 84-89.
165 Id. at 84.
166 Id. at 90-91. Beginning in August 1983, PCOs were effectuated pursuant to
President Marcos' Preventative Detention Act (PDA). See id at 89-90.
167 See id. at 93-94.
168 See AsIA WATCH, supra note 161, at 2-3. This perceived sensitivity was
explained as resulting from the assassination of her husband, Benigno Acquino, by
Marcos' forces. See id.
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human rights abuses.'6 9 However, no effort was made to prosecute mili-
tary personnel for the numerous human rights violations committed
under Marcos.' Speculation suggests that this hesitation was due, in
part, to Aquino's fear of losing military support.' 7 '
Regardless of the reasons for failing to fulfill her initial human rights
commitments, the Philippines remains a modem example of impunity.
While President Aquino most assuredly grappled with the delicate bal-
ance between restoring democracy and punishing military personnel for
past human rights abuses, violations should have been prosecuted under
numerous international legal theories. 172 The fact that the Truth Com-
mission, created under Presidential Directive, was disbanded without
ever issuing a report or findings relating to past abuses is also distres-
sing.'7 3 The failure to provide any documentation or official acknowl-
edgement of military offenses under the Marcos regime only furthers the
injury sustained by countless Filipinos. 4 While there may be acceptable
reasons not to prosecute individuals following a governmental transition
to democracy,1 5 there are no legitimate reasons to continue to withhold
or deny the truth of such pernicious events. 6 Certainly, in the case of
President Aquino and the Philippines the threat of military coups were
very real and sustainable. Sometimes all that can be expected in such
vulnerable communities is that the truth will someday be exposed. These
shortcomings, and the continued trepidation toward past military offend-
ers, results in the Filipinos being denied justice or accountability.
169 See id. at 3.
170 See idL
171 See id.
172 See id. at 7-36 (describing the application of human rights law, including
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions).
173 See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A
Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 597, 620-21 (1994).
174 See id. The seven-person committee, headed by Senator Jose W. Diokno, was
created without a staff or a budget, and was quickly overwhelmed by the large volume
of complaints, mostly directed at events of the past. See id. at 620. The committee's
work was cut short, and nothing definitive was ever produced, despite a year of
investigation and the filing of a number of high level cases in court, because in
January 1987, virtually the entire committee resigned after a military attack on a
peaceful demonstration in Manila killed several civilians. See id. No governmental
efforts to follow up the committee's work, or prosecute past offenders, ever took
place. See id.
175 See Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 2544-46.
176 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 117, at 509 (reminding that "Investigation itself,
and disclosure of the identities of those involved, can be a form of punishment. So
too can loss of rank, dismissal from a government post, loss of pension rights and
monetary fines").
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C. The Case of Japanese "Comfort Women"
One of the more gripping and still ongoing cases of impunity involves
the Japanese government's response to the treatment of former "Comfort
Women." The term "Comfort Women" (jugun ianfu) describes the more
than 200,000 Asian women who were enslaved by trickery, deceit or coer-
cion into forced prostitution by the Japanese military during World War
I.177 Four recent articles discussing the troubling Japanese response to
"Comfort Women" are: Karen Parker and Jennifer F. Chew's article,
Compensation for Japan's World War II War-Rape Victims, 78 Tong Yu's
Reparations for Former Comfort Women of World War J,179 Chin Kim
and Stanley S. Kim's article, Delayed Justice: The Case of the Japanese
Imperial Military Sex Slaves,' and Etsuro Totsuka's Commentary on a
Victory for "Comfort Women": Japan's Judicial Recognition of Military
Sexual Slavery.' 8' In addition, a thorough compilation of survivor testi-
mony may be found in TRUE STORIES OF THE KOREAN COMFORT
WOMEN, edited by Keith Howard." 2
The widespread existence of "Comfort Women" was first uncovered in
a 1978 expos6 prepared by Senda Kako, a prominent Japanese writer.
8 3
This extensive expos6 provided proof of more than 200,000 female sex
slaves who were forced to "service" the Japanese Imperial military
between 1937 and 1945.184 Subsequently, in 1991, the issue was thrust to
the forefront of Japanese politics when a South-Korean "Comfort
Woman" came forward with her personal story' 85 and joined two other
former "Comfort Women" in lodging suit against the Japanese govern-
ment for their suffering.'
8 6
Initially, the Japanese government vehemently denied both the exist-
ence of military-run brothels and the claims of the South Korean "Com-
177 Karen Parker & Jennifer F. Chew, Compensation for Japan's World War II
War-Rape Victims, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & ComP. L. REV. 497, 498 (1994). Parker &
Chew also explain that women and girls as young as twelve were taken from their
homes in Korea, China, the Dutch East Indies, Taiwan, Malaysia, Burma, and the
Philippines. See id.
178 Id.
179 Tong Yu, Reparations for Former Comfort Women of World War II, 36 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 528 (1995).
180 Chin Kim & Stanley S. Kim, Delayed Justice: The Case of the Japanese Imperial
Military Sex Slaves, 16 UcLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 263 (1998).
181 Etsuro Totsuka, Commentary on a Victory for "Comfort Women": Japan's
Judicial Recognition of Military Sexual Slavery, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 47 (1999).
182 TRUE STORIES OF THE KOREAN COMFORT WOMEN (Keith Howard, ed. 1995)
(English translation).
183 See Kim & Kim, supra note 180, at 265.
184 See id.
185 See Parker & Chew, supra note 177, at 502.
186 See Totsuka, supra note 181, at 49.
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fort Women.' 18 7 This attitude was reluctantly modified in 1992 when the
government was confronted with official documents confirming the mili-
tary's capture and use of "Comfort Women" and the Japanese govern-
ment's complicity in the program.18 8 Although the Japanese government
continued to deny that these women were forcibly enslaved, the existence
of the brothels and the government's participation and support of the
"Comfort Women" program was finally conceded.1
8 9
In 1993, the Japanese government officially acknowledged its shameful
role in both instituting comfort stations and forcibly "recruiting" or
abducting these women.190 At the time this concession was made, only
226 South Korean "Comfort Women" were believed to be alive.191 In
fact, only twenty-five percent of the victims are believed to have survived
their ordeal of repeated daily rapings. 192 Although the Japanese govern-
ment instituted a one billion-dollar program purportedly "to undertake
cultural and vocational projects as a token of apology for wrongs commit-
ted during World War II," there was no direct compensation offered or
reserved for the victims of sexual enslavement.' 3 Instead, the Japanese
government enlisted the assistance of the Japanese Red Cross in facilitat-
ing a privately funded effort to compensate the former "Comfort
Women."' 94 The Asian Women's Friendship and Peace Foundation Fund
was established in 1996 to collect sympathy money for these victims of
sexual crimes.' 95 In this and other disturbing modes, the Japanese gov-
ernment continues to avoid legal responsibility for its horrific system of
"Comfort Women."'
96
These failures culminated in a civil lawsuit brought by three South
Korean women, each of whom had been sexually enslaved and suffer the
stigma of former "Comfort Women.' 197 The plaintiffs sought monetary
compensation for their anguish, official acknowledgment of Japan's
involvement in these military crimes, a formal apology and an accurate
revision of Japanese textbooks to reflect the sinister nature of military
atrocities committed against women during World War 1.19' While the
187 See Yu, supra note 179, at 529.
188 See id. The uncovered records included official government documents of
conscription, transportation, placement, living conditions, management of comfort




191 See Kim & Kim, supra note 180, at 226.
192 See Parker & Chew, supra note 177, at 499.
193 See Yu, supra note 179, at 529-30.
194 See id.
195 See Kim & Kim, supra note 180, at 269.
196 See id. at 331.
.97 See TRUE STORIES OF THE KOREAN COMFORT WOMEN, supra note 182, at 193.
198 See Yu, supra note 179, at 537.
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trial has been extraordinarily successful in establishing a public record
regarding Japanese "Comfort Women," the plaintiffs did not fare as well.
Each plaintiff was awarded a mere 300,000 yen (approximately $ 2,270
U.S.) for their suffering.'99 Adding insult to still uncompensated injury,
the Japanese government has appealed the paltry awards.200
It is arguable that Japan remains liable not only for monetary damages
to the "Comfort Women" or their surviving dependents after enduring
fifty years of shameful silence, but also for punishment against the surviv-
ing perpetrators.20 ' War crimes against women, particularly those of a
violent sexual nature, are finally being recognized after years of inaction.
At the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, indi-
vidual defendants are finally being charged with rape and other forms of
sexual violence as war crimes and crimes against humanity.20 2 Still, the
issue of "Comfort Women" suffers the reticent fate of political will.
203
Much like the inertia demonstrated toward Pol Pot and the surviving
members of the Khmer Rouge, the international community's slow
response to sexual crimes committed against "Comfort Women" during
World War II may simply die out once the few remaining survivors per-
ish. It is for this reason that the "Comfort Women" remains an alarming
example of impunity.
V. MOVEMENT TOWARDS A SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY
[T]he idea of criminal sanctions for violations of international law
is both rare, and for the most part, quite recent.
204
199 Kim & Kim, supra note 180, at 263.
20 See id. (explaining that the Japanese government filed an appeal on 8 May
1998, despite previously acknowledging the "Comfort Women" system and the
military's role in committing these dishonorable sex crimes).
201 See Totsuka, supra note 181, at 51 (explaining that the Committee of Experts of
the International Labour Organisation ("ILO") officially noted in 1996 that the
"Comfort Women" system should be recognized as "sexual slavery" in violation of the
ILO Forced Labour Convention, and recommended that Japan, as a signatory to the
Convention, should give "proper consideration" to the matter).
202 See, e.g., International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (Prosecutor v. Furundzija), 1998, Case IT-95-17/1-
T10 (Dec. 10); United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (visited Dec. 20, 1999) <http:l/www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/
judgment/main.htm>.
203 See Parker & Chew, supra note 177, at 510-21 (providing a thorough
explanation of the illegality, under customary law, of the "Comfort Women" system
existing during World War II). Parker and Chew argue that rape as a war crime is jus
cogens and may not be excused under international law by any government. See id. at
540-42.
204 Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEx.
INT'L L. J. 237, 241 (1998) (emphasis added).
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Above all.., the case for prosecutions turns on the consequences of
failing to punish atrocious crimes committed by a prior regime ... "I
The fact that there are strong legal and moral arguments in favor of
prosecuting former human rights abusers does not eliminate the enor-
mous political difficulties that such a policy faces in the delicate bal-
ance of powers that characterize most transitions.2" 6
The first thing that must be recognized in a modem approach to
accountability is that criminal punishment for gross violations of human
rights no longer remains the only option. In fact, as the current South
African model demonstrates, it may no longer be the most preferred
course.20 7 While numerous scholars and activists have focused on the
many instances where criminal punishment has not been imposed (or per-
haps even attempted) following widespread and systematic atrocities, 208 it
is encouraging that the outgrowth of this impunity has been the creation
of substitute penalties. Accordingly, this final section will address the
various approaches to accountability that have been offered in response
to impunity.
A. Truth Commissions
The most vigorously touted option in dealing with past atrocities may
well be Truth Commissions or Commissions of Inquiry. These non-adver-
sarial bodies have been offered as an effective solution to many recent
calamities. Truth Commissions have been instituted under Presidential
Directives,0 9 influenced or supported by religious institutions, brokered
by U.N. settlement,210 and more recently, instigated by opposition par-
ties.211 The seminal piece in this area remains Priscilla Hayner's article,
Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study.212 In
205 See Orentlicher, supra note 23, at 2542 (emphasis added).
206 Juan E. M6ndez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JusTICE
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACI-S 1, 8-9 (A. James McAdams ed.,
1997) (representing one of several noteworthy articles in Professor McAdams's
country-focused compilation dealing with transitional settings in Greece, Bolivia,
Argentina, Chile, Hungary, Poland, East Germany and South Africa) (emphasis
added).
207 See South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://www.truth.org.za>.
208 See, e.g., supra notes 91-176 and accompanying text (discussing atrocities in
Latin America, the case of Leipzig, atrocities in Cambodia and atrocities in the
Philippines).
209 See Mark Ensalaco, Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report
and Assessment, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 656 (1994) (providing the case of Chile as an
example, like Argentina, of a truth commission created by a Presidential Directive).
210 See id. (providing the case of El Salvador as an example, like Haiti, of a truth
commission brokered by an U.N. settlement agreement).
211 See Klosterman, supra note 139, at 837.
212 Hayner, supra note 173.
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this celebrated piece, Ms. Hayner aptly sets forth the many advantages
that Truth Commissions proffer in dealing with gross violations of human
rights.213 Truth Commissions, she explains, are "official bodies set up to
investigate a past period of human rights abuses or violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law.,
214
Another proponent of utilizing Truth Commissions in response to gross
violations of human rights is Naomi Roht-Arriaza. Professor Roht-
Arriaza has written numerous pieces including, Truth Commissions as
Part of a Social Process: Possible Guidelines,215 and her influential book,
IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRAC-
TICE. 216 As Professor Roht-Arriaza notes, "[i]nformation gained by a
Commission in the course of hearing testimony from victims may help
point to higher-ups who should be targeted for criminal investigations
and prosecution.,
217
Still another instructive approach to Truth Commissions can be found
in Professor Martha Minow's book, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FOR-
GIVENESS. 218 Professor Minow explains that "[w]ith the aim of producing
a fair and thorough account of the atrocities, a truth commission proceeds
on the assumption that it helps individuals to tell their stories and to have
them acknowledged officially."21 9 More than most other authors, how-
ever, Minow presents a therapeutic approach to Truth Commissions,
focusing on the ameliorative effect that purging such experiences can
have on victims and survivors of human rights violations.220
Even strong advocates of criminal punishment have accepted the
restorative qualities of Truth Commissions in certain instances. 22' This
has been particularly true in response to the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.222 Unlike many of the Latin American
213 See id.
214 Id. at 598.
215 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth Commissions as Part of a Social Process: Possible
Guidelines, in REIGNING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 5, at 280.
216 IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACICE
(Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed. 1995).
217 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, supra note 5, at 280.
218 MINOW, supra note 135.
219 Id. at 61.
220 See id. at 80-89.
221 See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, International Criminal Law and the Cambodian
Killing Fields, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 705 (1997) (explaining, in a recent
reflection regarding the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, that:
One of the principle virtues of truth commissions is the extent to which they
can potentially engage society in a broadly-gauged and broad-ranging
deliberative process about its past.... In these and other respects, the process of
accountability engendered by truth commissions tends to be more inclusive than
that of criminal trials).
222 See id.
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examples where full-scale amnesties overshadowed any truth seeking
process, the South African approach provides for the use of amnesties on
an individual basis under limited circumstances.223 As Neil Kritz notes:
The price of such amnesty is that individuals must apply and pro-
vide full details of their crimes to the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission - a powerful incentive to come forward and assist the
Commission in its work.... Arguably, the only reason that the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission has been as effective as it has in elic-
iting thousands of confessions of apartheid-era crimes is because the
threat of prosecution remains real.224
But caution is still required. Very few Truth Commissions result in tri-
als of any kind, even when the identity of the violators and the extent of
the atrocities are widely known. 25 Mere resort to Truth Commissions
may not be sufficient to discharge a State's duties under various instru-
ments of international law. As discussed above, certain international
treaties require governments to extradite or prosecute.226 The use of
Truth Commissions, without more, does not fulfill this duty. Juan M6n-
dez acknowledges this limitation in his article, In Defense of Transitional
Justice. Professor Mndez notes that "[t]he most extreme form of token-
ism ... results when a truth commission is proposed as an alternative to
criminal prosecutions and not as a step in the direction of
accountability. ,
2 27
Truth Commissions provide but one tool in a spectrum of accountabil-
ity mechanisms. In countries where prosecutions are not feasible, due
most often to a lack of resources, a recognized threat to democracy or a
lack of political will, Truth Commissions may provide supplementary jus-
tice until such time as full justice may be achieved. And, as Priscilla Hay-
ner notes:
The most straightforward reason to set up a truth commission is
that of sanctioned fact finding: to establish an accurate record of a
country's past, and thus help to provide a fair record of a country's
history and its government's much-disputed acts. Leaving an honest
account of the violence prevents history from being lost or re-writ-
ten, and allows a society to learn from its past in order to prevent a
repetition of such violence in the future .... [T]he importance of
223 See Amnesty Committee, The Amnesty Committee of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://www.truth.org.za>.
224 Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability
Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, LAW & CoNrTMri. PROBS., Autumn
1996, at 127, 143.
225 See, e.g., Hayner, supra note 173 (providing an example of a Truth Commission
conducting extensive investigations and filing cases in court, however resulting in a
limited number of trials and no punishment).
226 See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 51.
227 Mndez, supra note 206, at 15.
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truth commissions might be described more accurately as acknowl-
edging the truth rather than finding the truth.228
B. Lustration Laws and Purgings
With the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, democracy finally infiltrated
portions of Eastern Europe that had been dominated by oppressive rule
for several decades.229 But unlike Latin America where death squads
were effectuating "disappearances" and inflicting terror through physical
torture, the oppression in Europe seemingly took on a different dimen-
sion.2"' It is only appropriate then, that the European communities have
turned to distinct measures for addressing their years of communist
rule.23'
Tina Rosenberg fittingly received the National Book Award and Pulit-
zer Price for her groundbreaking report on post-Communist Europe in
THE HAUNTED LAND. 232 The book eloquently recounts the shift to
democracy in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Germany.233 Endemic in these
regime changes is the concept of "lustration." Literally translated, "lus-
tration" refers to "the performance of an expiatory sacrifice or purifica-
tion rite. '234 In the former Czechoslovokia, this meant that individuals
who were named in secret police files as former government collabora-
tors or informants were involuntarily dismissed from their government
positions.235 Thousands of individuals on the list of collaborators were
condemned without trial.236 Their relationships with colleagues, friends
228 Hayner, supra note 173, at 607.
229 See TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND 70 (1995).
230 See id. While death was less certain in Europe, there were at least 140,000
people imprisoned for acts against the communist state. See id.
231 While many of the events that occurred in Eastern Europe might not constitute
gross violations of human rights, the use of lustration laws and administrative
purgings requires explanation. Any discussion of accountability requires details
regarding lustration. See generally TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND (1995).
232 Id.
233 See generally id. (recounting Czechoslovakia, Poland and Germany's shift to
democracy).
234 NEIER, supra note 93, at 56; see also Ved P. Nanda, Civil and Political Sanctions
as an Accountability Mechanism for Massive Violations of Human Rights, in
REIGNING IN IMPUNITY 313, 318 n.22 (explaining that "[t]he word 'lustration' is
derived from the Latin lustrara, meaning 'to put light on' or illuminate. It is also said
to be derived from lustrum, described as a purifying sacrifice carried on every five
years in Imperial Rome, or the Latin lustratio, which means purification by sacrifice
or purging.").
235 See ROSENBERG, supra note 229, at 67-121. While there were no criminal
sanctions imposed, these individuals were precluded from returning to these positions
for at least five years. See id. at 98-99.
236 See id. at 106.
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and family were unalterably changed.23 7 The Czech experience has been
sharply criticized because some believe that "lustration went further than
the law provided., 238 The Czech laws have been condemned by such
prestigious human rights organizations as the United Nations Interna-
tional Labor Organization, the Council of Europe, and Helsinki Watch.23 9
While administrative purges may further democracy by dismissing col-
laborators and culpable individuals from blossoming democratic institu-
tions, these purgings mandate a modicum of due process to truly
reconcile a fractured society. This is particularly important when the evi-
dence against individuals has been obtained by secret police files or mili-
tary records that may lack credibility.
240
Nonetheless, lustration and administrative purgings may serve a signifi-
cant, it not symbolic, purpose in combating impunity. As Professor
Naomi Roht-Ariazza notes:
Redressing grave human rights violations may also require reor-
ganization of the state apparatus to prevent recurrence of the viola-
tion. This may include disbanding or reforming military or police
structures, and dismissing or withholding the pension rights of those
in charge. The disbanding of repressive security apparatus and dis-
missal from office of individuals involved in violations will help ease
the fear of victims and their families that they could again be
targeted.241
C. Reparations
Juan M6ndez articulates four principles that should be sought during
accountability in his article, In Defense of Transitional Justice.242 First,
States should seek to do justice.2 43 In this regard, Professor M6ndez con-
tends that prosecution and punishment is required for gross violations of
human rights. 24 Second, States should grant the victims the right to
237 See id.
238 See NEIER, supra note 93, at 57.
239 See ROSENBERG, supra note 229, at 97-98.
240 See Ved P. Nanda, Civil and Political Sanctions as an Accountability Mechanism
for Massive Violations of Human Rights, in REiGNING IN IMPuNrrY, supra note 5, at
313, 322 (observing that:
A blanket exclusion of all who belonged to a party, or of those whose names
are found on some files seen by those now in power, smacks of imposing
collective guilt.... Due process protections must be ensured. There must be a
right to appeal, and there must be transparency. The process must be formal and
the proceedings open).
241 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave
Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 449, 482 (1990).
242 Mndez, supra note 206, at 1.
243 See id.
244 See id. at 12.
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know the truth.245 The "right to truth" has been proposed by several
scholars as a foundational aspect of accountability.246 Third, States
should grant reparations to victims. 247 These reparations can take many
forms, but should attempt to restore the victims to their prior status as
much as that remains possible. 248 Finally, Professor M6ndez calls for the
dismissal of human rights abusers from positions of power in any capacity
in the armed or security forces of the state.249
Increasingly, scholars and activists are addressing the need for victim
25reparations. ° In modem writings, the demand for reparations has
increased, perhaps in response to the demonstrated impotency of criminal
justice at the international level.251 Reparations may take a variety of
forms. Money damages provide one (often limited) possibility. Modern
attempts at reparations have included such acknowledgements as an offi-
cial day of remembrance, monuments and educational efforts that avoid
revisionist history.252 However, Professor Minow warns:
Reparations, restitution, and apologies present distinct promises
and problems as responses to mass atrocity. Each deserves consider-
ation; each belongs in the lexicon of political responses to collective
245 See id.
246 See, e.g,. NEIER, supra note 93, at 55 (remarking that "[t]ruth is a powerful
weapon"), and Zalaquett, supra note 100, at 31 (contending that it is not enough that
mass media or other sources disseminate the truth, rather it is important that the truth
be established in an officially sanctioned way, allowing the findings to form part of the
historical record of the nation and establishing an authoritative version of the events
over and above political considerations).
247 See Mdndez, supra note 206, at 12.
248 See id.
249 See id. Professor M6ndez also suggests that the realization of these four goals
should be seen as a process, not simply as a result. See id.
250 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 135.
251 See id. at 50-51, 87. Professor Minow devotes an entire chapter of her recent
book to the subject of reparations. See id. at 91.
252 See Yael Danieli, Justice and Reparation: Steps in the Process of Healing, in
REIGNING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 5, at 303, 310. The author observes the healing
nature of commemoration as follows:
Commemorations can fill the vacuum with creative responses and may help
heal the rupture not only internally, but also that rupture that victimization
creates between the survivors and their society.
In contrast to the loneliness, commemoration provides a shared context, with
shared pain, mourning and memory. The nation has transformed it into part of
its consciousness. What may be an obligatory one-day-a-year ritual to others is
experienced by the victims as a gesture of continued support.
There should be general awareness on a high level, including information and
education about how the situation arose and its consequences. There should be
inter-generational dialogue, and dialogues between children of survivors and of
perpetrators. There should be statutes, paintings, scholarships, rooms in colleges
and museums, and streets named after heroes and martyrs.
Id. at 310-11.
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violence. Yet nothing in this discussion should imply that money
payments, returned property, restored religious sites, or apologies
seal the wounds, make victims whole, or clean the slate.253
For these reasons, prosecutions remain the cornerstone of any accounta-
bility program. Only prosecutions truly exemplify a respect for and
adherence to the law recited in the numerous international treaties gov-
erning gross violations of human rights.
D. The International Criminal Court
As Professor Martha Minow observes, "[i]t is hard not to notice ... the
gap in time between the Nuremberg trials and any comparable effort to
prosecute war crimes in international settings." '254 This lull changed dra-
matically, however, in 1993 when the U.N. established the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 55 Shortly thereafter, the
U.N. followed suit and established a second tribunal in response to the
genocidal acts in Rwanda.256 These two ad hoc bodies, and the unspeak-
able tragedies that culminated in their creation, provided the necessary
catalyst for the long-awaited adoption of an International Criminal Court
("ICC") statute. On 17 July 1998, the international community (com-
prised of scholars, dignitaries, governmental and NGO representatives)
voted to adopt the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.257
This watershed development in international law is arguably the most
positive development since Nuremberg. Finally there may be a perma-
nent institution responsible for avoiding the instances of impunity dis-
played in Cambodia, the Philippines and toward the former "Comfort
Women." However, this Court will not have retrospective jurisdiction.
This means that the three instances of Asian impunity discussed above
remain the responsibility of individual States or the international commu-
nity to rectify. Because the ICC is the result of numerous compromises
and remains tied to concepts of national sovereignty, there is no assur-
ance that we have at once arrived at a solution. The mirage of justice
looms dimly on the horizon, but its full potential has yet to be reached.25
253 MiNow, supra note 135, at 117.
254 Id. at 27.
255 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal, supra note 84.
256 See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 85.
257 See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 189/9, 37 I.L.M.
999 (1998). There were 120 delegations in favor, seven opposed, and twenty-one
abstentions, with the United States casting one of the negative votes. See Association
of American Law Schools, Panel Discussion: Association of American Law Schools
on the International Criminal Court, 36 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 223 (1999). In order to
take effect, the ICC Statute will require ratification by sixty states. See id.
258 As of October 20, 1999, only four States (Italy, San Marino, Senegal and
Trinidad/Tobago) of the sixty states required for entry into force have ratified the ICC
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VI. CONCLUSION
A policy to deal with human rights abuses should have two overall
objectives: to prevent the recurrence of such abuses and to repair the
damage they caused, to the extent that is possible.2"'
Impunity presents one of the most viable impediments to the full
achievement of human rights. This literature review has brought together
a vast array of writings and authors in an attempt to assist those who
work to combat impunity. This work is but a small effort to better the
world. In hopefully educating others there is a chance that this work will
somehow manage to change the minds of those whose are in a position to
effectuate true change.
Impunity is something that we as a world continue to accept, tolerate
and implicitly sanction. This does not mean that we cannot change. In
closing, this paper leaves you with the thoughts and words of Professor
Martha Minow, whose powerful description this author surely could not
improve upon:
Mass violence is different. Torture, kidnappings, and murder -
regimes of rape and terror - call for more severe responses than
would ordinary criminal conduct, even the murder of an individual.
And yet, there is no punishment that could express the proper scale
of outrage.
260
Living after genocide, mass atrocity, totalitarian terror ... makes
remembering and forgetting not just about dealing with the past.
The treatment of the past through remembering and forgetting cru-
cially shapes the present and future for individuals and entire
societies.26'
Statute. See United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courts
(visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http:/lwww.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm>.
259 Zalaquett, supra note 100, at 29 (emphasis added).
260 MINOW, supra note 135, at 121.
261 Id. at 119.
